Au début du deuxième livre des Seconds Analytiques ( APo. ), Aristote présente quatre types de recherche possible, qu’il distingue de la manière suivante : la recherche du que ; la recherche du pourquoi ; la recherche de si c’est ; et la recherche de ce que c’est. Le sens propre et les connexions mutuelles du premier, deuxième et quatrième types de recherche ne posent pas de grand problème, ayant par ailleurs été partiellement exposés dans d’autres contextes. Il en va (...) cependant autrement du troisième type de recherche. La pertinence de telles difficultés peut être saisie par la double lecture que permet la clause grecque ei estin (« si c’est ») qui s’y rapporte. Devons-nous la comprendre dans le sens de « si telle chose est (ou : si telle chose existe ) » (par exemple, « si le centaure existe ») ou dans le sens de « si ceci est tel » (par exemple, « si ceci est un centaure »)? Dans le but de répondre à cette question, nous adopterons le programme suivant : 1. En premier lieu, nous ferons une analyse aussi proche et détaillée que possible de APo. II 1-2, de manière à déterminer le sens qui doit y être donné à la clause ei estin (« si c’est »). 2. Nous chercherons ensuite à démontrer la conclusion à laquelle nous avons abouti en nous aidant des chapitres suivants des APo., chapitres dans lesquels la question est à nouveau explicitement et implicitement invoquée. 3. Enfin, nous analyserons les autres passages du corpus aristotélicien dans lesquels la critique a relevé de supposées « hypothèses d’existence », et ce, de manière à vérifier si ceux-ci sont susceptibles d’une lecture compatible avec celle qui aura été donnée de APo. II 1-2. Nous en conclurons que l’on ne retrouve aucune trace de préoccupations existentielles dans les passages qui ont fait l’objet de cette recherche ni, en général, dans les passages connexes du corpus aristotélicien. Ainsi, la lecture existentielle de la clause ei estin et des hypothèses scientifiques qui y sont liées sont plutôt le fruit d’une contamination moderne. (shrink)

O sentido deste ensaio é o de pensar o sentido e o lugar da filosofia na época da globalização, mas por via de um recuo histórico, por forma a desafiar a visão dominante segundo a qual a globalização é um fenômeno atual. Para o efeito, procurarei abordar quatro questões: 1) Em que ambiente sociocultural, melhor, em que civilização, se dá a ruptura que conhecemos aqui por “primeira globalização”? 2) Que modo de consciência veio ela perturbar e alterar? 3) Que efeitos (...) teve sobre a filosofia tal perturbação? 4) Que tem o homem moderno e a filosofia atual a aprender com a resposta às três questões anteriores? (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

The deep relationship between the Phaedo and the Parmenides has long been recognised. However, this relationship is usually seen from the point of view of the alleged criticism in Plato's Parmenides of the theory of ideas contained in the Phaedo and in the dialogues which are doctrinally akin to it. For this reason, the thesis argued for in this article is a much rarer one: namely, that the Parmenides represents, within the unity of Plato's thought, the single moment in which (...) the theory of ideas proposed in the Phaedo is radically demonstrated and the notion of 'idea' becomes fully clarified. The objective of this paper is to investigate both dialogues from the point of view of the notion of 'idea' that they implicitly propound, taking into consideration two crucial passages of the Phaedo and the Parmenides whose significance, although frequently ignored, permits overall such a notion to be established. Through this commentary it will then be possible to attain, as its final goal, an enlightening understanding of the nature of platonic 'idea'. But another consequence follows from it: the preclusion of the common, yet particularly misleading, translation of είδος by "Form". (shrink)

Over time, several authors have argued that, for Aristotle, dialectic is a method of discovery or establishment of the principles of science in general. In this article, I will present four arguments against this view and propose a deflationary view of the role of dialectic in this regard. Accord ing to this view, such a role consists only in the defence of common principles against potential eristic attacks. Keywords: Science, dialectic, first principles, common principles, proper principles.

This book addresses the issue of natural simultaneity of relatives, discussed by Aristotle in Categories 7, 7b15-8a12. Natural simultaneity is a form of symmetrical ontological dependence that holds between items that are not causally linked. In this section of the Categories, Aristotle introduces this topic in his analysis of relatives and maintains that, although relatives seem to be for the most part simultaneous by nature, there seem to be some exceptions. He mentions two pairs of relatives as exceptions, namely the (...) pairs knowledge/knowable and perception/perceptible, and argues at length for the priority of the second relative over the first one in each case. Through a close reading of this text, the author analyses Aristotle's arguments for the thesis of the exceptional character of these pairs and shows that all of them are unsuccessful in supporting the thesis. In order to draw this conclusion, the author highlights and carefully considers the properties that Aristotle is committed to attributing to relatives, taking into account the metaphysical framework of the Categories as well as their specificities within the set of non-substantial categories. Then, he shows that Aristotle's mature views on relatives in the Metaphysics can be construed as committing him to the rejection of such a thesis. Although the issue of natural simultaneity is just one of several that Aristotle considers in his discussion of relatives throughout Categories 7, it is a particularly relevant issue, since it involves a number of puzzles whose analysis allows for a better understanding of the very notion of relativity in Aristotle. This is the first book to explore this issue from the perspective of illuminating the Aristotelian views on relatives. Aristotle on Natural Simultaneity of Relatives in the Categories will appeal to scholars and graduate students working on Aristotle, ancient philosophy in general, and metaphysics. (shrink)

In this article, we aim to offer a new overall interpretation of Heraclitus’ philosophy, through an analysis of his own implicit conception of ‘philosophy’, as it is insinuated in the few but important fragments where the word philia occurs. In these fragments, a clear distinction between reality and appearance is drawn for the first time in the history of philosophy; and, accordingly, philosophy itself is hinted at as a direct ‘attachment’ to reality, beyond the appearances that conceal it. Using this (...) result as a hermeneutic principle, a thorough survey of the most significant fragments is then proposed. The outcome of such a survey is, hopefully, the presentation of Heraclitus’ main doctrines as a coherent whole. (shrink)

Any analysis of the Hippocratic anthropology must begin by taking a stand on two quite different issues. On the one hand, it must ascertain a precise and definite meaning of the word ‘Hippocratic’ in such a context, considering the historical problems surrounding the 'real' Hippocrates and the doctrinal heterogeneity of the Hippocratic collection. On the other hand, it must justify the very possibility of an anthropology within the Hippocratic tradition, by accommodating it with the obvious animadversion that its most representative (...) works show towards any philosophical or speculative inquiry. The first problem can be solved by purely historical means, viz. by restricting the object of analysis to the texts that admittedly represent the views of the Hippocratic school. Not so with the second one, which constitutes the truesignificant problem from a philosophical point of view and with which the present article is therefore concerned. After discussing the texts where the question on the nature of man is posed, a general survey of the Hippocratic conception of the theoretical and scientific foundations of clinical practice is given, in order to understand the Statement according to which it is to medicine, and not to philosophy, that an answer to such a question truly belongs. From such a survey a thesis arises: that, according to the Hippocratic perspective, the appropriate answer to the question on the nature of man is not the one that seeks to determine what man is, even by means of the empirical methods of medicine, but the one that reshapes the question itself, thereby replacing the philosophical focus on the knowing of man, for the sake of knowledge, by the clinical focus on the caring of man, for the sake of man himself. (shrink)

First, there will be as close and detailed an analysis as possible of the first two chapters of the second book of Posterior Analytics, which constitute the canonical place of the controversy, in Order to determine the meaning that should be restored there to the clause εἰ ἔστιν. After this, we will try to corroborate the conclusion we arrive at concerning the clause mentioned above by applying it to the subsequent passages of the same book where this question is raised (...) again, either implicitly or explicitly. Finally, an examination will be made of the rest of the passages of the Aristotelian corpus, where the critic has found the occurrence of the alleged “hypothesis of existence”, chiefly in the second book of the Prior Analytics, in order to verify if such passages also offer the possibility of a reading consistent with that offered by the first two chapters initially studied. The conclusion will be that no traces of existential concern are found in any of the places searched, nor in general, in any of the connected texts within the Aristotelian corpus, and that the reading of the clause εἰ ἔστιν and of the corresponding scientific hypotheses from an existential angle are the result of a modern contamination whose origin will be diagnosed. (shrink)

Este livro não é uma sebenta nem um manual, mas um instrumento de trabalho. Como tal, não foi concebido para ser lido nem estudado, mas sim para ser utilizado, à medida das necessidades e interesses do estudante ou do iniciado em Filosofia Antiga.

Il est devenu un lieu commun de déclarer l a nature essentiellement indéfinissable de la philosophie. Dans cet article, nous essayons de réfut er cette thèse selon des critères à la fois philosophiques et pédagogiques, développant l'analyse dans le cadre des programmes actuels de l'enseignement secondaire, mais tenant compte des exigences, en général, d'une vraie introduction à la philosophie.

Resumo No segundo capítulo das Categorias, Aristóteles introduz um esquema conceptual de acordo com o qual, recorrendo a dois únicos critérios, “estar num sujeito” e “dizer-se de um sujeito”, é possível distribuir a realidade por quatro tipos de entes: as substâncias individuais, que nem estão num sujeito nem se dizem de um sujeito; as substâncias universais, que se dizem de um sujeito, mas não estão num sujeito; os acidentes individuais, que estão num sujeito, mas não se dizem de um sujeito; (...) e os acidentes universais, que estão num sujeito e se dizem de um sujeito. O problema coloca-se ao nível do terceiro tipo de entes, os acidentes individuais, em virtude, em particular, do modo como são definidos no texto, a saber, como algo que “não pode ser separadamente daquilo em que está”. Ora a importância desta cláusula, e, portanto, da sua correcta interpretação, vai muito para além de uma simples decisão em matéria textual ou mesmo doutrinária, se a restringirmos ao passo e à questão em apreço. Nela, joga-se todo o sentido que Aristóteles deseja atribuir à individualidade das inerências e, através dela, o modo como é por ele concebida a distinção ontológica entre substâncias e acidentes individuais, enquanto tipos diversos de itens individuais. Este, pois, o objecto do presente estudo: apreender o sentido e o fundamento da distinção entre substâncias e acidentes individuais em Aristóteles, a partir de uma análise do estatuto das inerências no segundo capítulo das Categorias. Palavras-chave : acidente, Aristóteles, Categorias, individual, inerências, substânciaIn the second chapter of Categories, Aristotle introduces a conceptual scheme in accordance to which, using only two criteria, “being in a subject” and “said of a subject”, it is possible to distribute reality over four types of beings: individual substances, which are neither in a subject nor are said of a subject; universal substances, which are said of a subject but are not in a subject; individual accidents, which are in a subject, but are not said of a subject; and universal accidents, which are in a subject and are said of a subject. The problem arises with the third type of entity, individual accidents, due to the way they are defined in the text, namely as something which “cannot exist separately from what it is in”. The importance of this clause, and therefore of its correct interpretation, goes far beyond the mere decision on textual or even doctrinal matters, if restricted to the passage and to the question under consideration. What is at stake here is the significance that Aristotle wishes to attribute to the individuality of inherences and, through that, the way in which the ontological distinction between individual substances and individual accidents – that is to say, between primary substances and their accidents as diverse types of individual items – is conceived by him. Here, then, is the scope of this paper: to grasp the meaning and the rationale of the distinction between individual substances and individual accidents in Aristotle, based on the analysis of the statute of inherences in the second chapter of the Categories. Keywords: accident, Aristotle, categories, individual, inherences, substance. (shrink)

This paper aims to defend the unitarian position of Plato’s thought through an analysis of the Sophist in its relation with other middle and late dialogues. Contrary to those who consider that koinonia is an exclusive philosophical motif of the late period and represents a break with the dialogues of the intermediate period, the text seeks to defend how koinonia in the Sophist is not a rupture but a development and a consummation of Platonic positions sustained since the middle dialogues.

This article, The ontological argument in Plato: the problem of immortality, discusses the interpretation of Socrates’ last demonstration of the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo as an ”ontological argument” and tries to refute this interpretation through an examination of the concept of immortality in Plato and its implications on the central relation soul/life. At the same time, it argues that the ontological argument should be seen as the very back-bone of Plato’s ontology, a point of view which will (...) be developed in a forthcoming paper. (shrink)

A edição das Obras Completas de Aristóteles em língua portuguesa que, por iniciativa do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa e com o apoio da Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia, começou a ser publicada pela editora portuguesa Imprensa Nacional – Casa da Moeda em 2004, arrancou de uma constatação: o número extremamente insuficiente de traduções dos escritos aristotélicos publicadas em Portugal até a esse momento (apenas seis, algumas das quais antigas, desactualizadas ou insatisfatórias: Categorias, Sobre a Alma, Política, (...) Retórica, Poética e Constituição dos Atenienses) e, em consequência, o fraco nível de interesse da comunidade filosófica portuguesa pelo autor e o muito deficitário grau de conhecimento, do público em geral, em relação à obra e ao pensamento deste grande filósofo. (shrink)